A Report on the Indian Think Tank Delegation to China, December 2015

An Indian think tank delegation was invited by the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in India and hosted by the China Foreign Affairs University (CFAU) to Beijing and Shanghai from 15 December to 22 December 2015. The delegation consisted of 28 participants from the Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF), Observer Research Foundation (ORF), Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), Institute of Chinese Studies (ICS), Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), Forum for Strategic Initiatives (FSI) and National Maritime Foundation (NMF), headed by Brigadier Vinod Anand. Interactions were held with various Chinese universities and think tanks – China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), CFAU, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), Tsinghua University, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS) and Fudan University, along with meetings with senior officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), PRC.

The main themes of the discussions were the rise of China in the Asia-Pacific region replacing the United States, its efforts to set up multilateral mechanism of One Belt One Road (OBOR) for development of the region and India’s concerns about the OBOR, especially the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and China’s strategic objectives in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. There were also deliberations on China’s concerns about the strategic partnership of India, Japan and the United States (US) and India’s role in the South China Sea. Besides, a considerable time was spent on finding a common ground on countering Islamic terrorism. The boundary dispute and other contentious issues like Jammu and Kashmir, Tibet and transnational rivers found place only as isolated remarks or queries.

Beijing

The Chinese participants, led by Prof Ruan Zongze, Vice-President of CIIS, argued strongly that the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) was an initiative to undermine the emerging economies or the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and so India should shed its hesitation and join the OBOR that would benefit the entire Asia-Pacific region. He believed that it would not serve India’s interests to negotiate a deal with the US within the TPP framework. Instead, the BCIM (Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar) project of the OBOR would be more consistent with Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Act East Policy and India’s strategic and economic objectives. The Indian delegation replied that India has multiple concerns about OBOR, and unless China clarifies the objectives and the roadmap of OBOR, it will be very difficult to commit to the China-led mechanism. As far as relations with the US are concerned, India pursues an independent foreign policy, not centred on China, just as China has its separate relations with the US. Indeed, India also is not enthused when concepts like G2 are proposed for a US-China dual hegemony. Both sides, however, were positive about the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a proposed free trade agreement (FTA) of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), India, China, South Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. RCEP could be a counterweight to TPP if it gets finalised and approved by all the partners.

In CFAU, our delegation met Prof Qin Yaqin, President of CFAU, after which we had a separate symposium on OBOR, Asian Connectivity and Regional Integration. The Chinese side was led by Prof Wei Ling, Director of the Institute for Asian Studies, CFAU. Different aspects of OBOR and other regional mechanisms like RCEP, Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO) and South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) were discussed, and the need for greater co-operation was asserted by both sides. The Chinese side justified the lack of clarity on OBOR as a policy of ‘crossing the river by groping the stones’, i.e. according to the evolution of regional situation and interests, OBOR would acquire its characteristics. Nevertheless, OBOR is intended to promote connectivity and development of the Western region of China, which, unlike the Eastern region with access to open seas and rich neighbours, requires state support for economic development. The Chinese side also argued that there are many non-traditional security challenges like climate change and terrorism requiring cooperation and partnership among all countries in the region. Moreover, there is diffusion of power and interdependence in a globalised world order, rendering the concepts of multipolarity and balance of power redundant. So, the American rebalancing strategy (previously, Pivot to Asia) is impractical; India should shed its scepticism and become a partner in OBOR. When the Indian side raised concerns about common terrorist threat to India and China from Islamic terrorism emanating from Pakistan, the reluctance of China to criticise Pakistan and resolve the boundary dispute with India, the Chinese side held that Pakistan is also a victim of terrorism and China cannot jeopardise its ‘all-weather friendship’ for some minor terrorist incidents and advised India to resolve its disputes with Pakistan through dialogue. It also termed the boundary dispute with India as a minor issue hyped by the Indian media. Prof Su Hao (CFAU) was also present at the symposium. He proposed three levels of engagement between China and India – multilateral, triangular and two plus one. The multilateral engagement includes regional organisations such as RCEP, SCO and SAARC. The triangular engagement involves the partnership of both China and India with another country. For instance, Japan invests both in China and India, and that is a win-win-win situation. China should not perceive Japan-India partnership as a threat; instead compete with Japan for business opportunities in India. The two plus one engagement means that both countries should have joint foreign policies in neighbouring countries like Nepal, Myanmar and Afghanistan, where China and India have common interests, to avoid misunderstanding and unhealthy competition.

In CICIR, we had a symposium with a Chinese delegation led by Dr Wang Shida, the Vice Director of the Institute of South Asian, Southeast Asian and Oceanic Studies, CICIR, on Political and Security Situations in South Asia and Sino-Indian Relations. Discussions centred around the scope for increasing soft power co-operation through people-to-people contacts, joint film projects and media coverage of each other. The Chinese side enumerated the main problems as the lack of progress in the resolution of the border dispute, military capacity building in the border areas, India’s conflict with Pakistan, the strategic partnership of India, the US and Japan and India’s activities in the South China Sea. The Indian side emphasised that as far as India-China relations are concerned, there has been lot of progress in trade, multilateralism and culture, but there is serious mistrust in border dispute, military deployment in the border areas, China-Pakistan relations, especially the CPEC related activities in the disputed territory of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) and military and nuclear technology transfer to Pakistan and China’s reluctance to criticise cross border terrorism sponsored by Pakistan. On the South China Sea, the Indian side clarified that 55 per cent of India’s trade passes through the area and hence India has interests in the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. On China’s perception of the constitutional crisis in Nepal, the Chinese side replied that China has three principles – non-interference in the domestic affairs, management of Tibetan political activities and economic support.

Prof Yan Xuetong, the Dean of the Institute of Modern International Relations, Tsinghua University, explained that they have developed a Tsinghua Approach to International Relations (IR), applying ancient Chinese thought, modern IR theory, scientific methodology and the experience of China’s rise. The central puzzle is that although China is deficient in comparison to the US due to a democracy deficit, economic imbalance and military weakness, how China has reduced the power gap with the US in the last 10-15 years. To solve the puzzle, the IR scholars at Tsinghua have developed the theory of Moral Realism. Morality means the national political leadership should be responsible, reliable and goal-oriented, learning from the national conditions, not borrowing ideas from the hegemon. In the last 10-15 years, China has had the moral leadership of the Communist Party that has both strength and good ideas, but the US has suffered from inconsistent leadership, with President George W. Bush, who was strong but had bad ideas and President Barack H. Obama, who has good ideas but is weak. That is a contrast from the strong and smart leadership of President Bill Clinton in the 1990s. Realism means the international power structure determines the status of a nation, and conflict among nations and balance of power strategies are the unchangeable realities of international politics. There is no final solution to conflict and power politics, only conflict management to avoid full-scale wars. Thus, co-operation can only be conditional, and there can be no compromise on core interests. For instance, China would never accept the independence of Taiwan, the US would not allow non-peaceful integration of Taiwan into China, and so, the status quo is the only way to avoid war.

Our delegation had representations from realist, liberal and postmodern perspectives. From the realist perspective, the question was whether India had to choose between American hegemony and Sinocentric order in Asia-Pacific and what situation may emerge in the coming decades – strategic balance, i.e. economic interdependence keeps political friction under control; ‘dragon fire’, i.e. the US returns to isolation and China prevails; or fragile China, i.e. China’s economic downturn creates a power vacuum and India emerges as a strategic balancer. The liberal argument was that the global governance institutions have inherent deficiencies and biases originating in the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference, where the Anglo-American strategists had entrenched their hegemony. So, the important question is whether alternative institutions developed by the emerging economies, e.g. New Development Bank (NDB) and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), would be more inclusive and equitable, or the same power interests would prevail. The postmodern problem was that in the great power politics between China and India, the minority communities residing in the Himalayan Region were marginalised and their language and culture were on the verge of extinction. Therefore, the enquiry was whether the Tsinghua Approach had any solution to such problems. Another issue was the possibility of India and China working together to develop civilisational universalism based on the teachings of Buddha, Confucius, Mahatma Gandhi and Rabindranath Tagore. The response of Prof Yan was that neither the isolation of the US nor the decline of China was a possibility in the next decade. Hence, there would be bipolarity in the Asia-Pacific. India should, in its national interest, revive non-alignment and extract maximum benefits from both the US and China. It will not be possible for India to emerge as a separate pole unless it gains a moral leadership that can make it strong and rich, which is impossible, as it has a system of government not rooted in Indian conditions. On globalisation, Prof Yan stated that it was a process of the rich, by the rich and for the rich, and the poor are incapable of resisting it, so they will remain marginalised, and the gap between the rich and the poor cannot be removed. On the emerging economies, he said that BRICS is an unreal term because Russia and Brazil are shrinking economies, India and South Africa have too many problems, and it is not possible for China to revive these economies or solve their problems. He predicted that BRICS would cease to exist by 2023. On the Tsinghua Approach, he explained Moral Realism and then mentioned that every country should develop its local IR theory rooted in its traditions because a country suffering from an identity crisis can never develop moral leadership. However, it is inefficient for great powers to concentrate on marginal issues, so these issues will always be at the periphery of international politics.

Shanghai

In Shanghai, there were two symposiums – one at SIIS on World Counter-Terrorism Situation and Global Governance with the Chinese team led by Prof Chen Dongxiao, President of SIIS and the other at Fudan University on Asia Pacific Situations and Relations between China, US and India with Prof Shen Dingli, Vice President of the School of International Studies, Fudan University. In SIIS, Prof Zhao Gancheng, Director of the Center of Asia-Pacific Studies, spoke on counter-terrorism and stressed the need for India and China to cooperate to tackle both the terrorist infrastructure and ideology. Prof Ye Jiang, Director of the Institute for Global Governance Studies, addressed the global governance issues and how India and China could engage at various levels. The Indian side also made presentations, which were followed by questions and answers. In Fudan University, Prof Shen Dingli stressed the necessity of changing the perception of Indians and Chinese towards one another. He admitted that India was a great civilisation with 8000 years of antiquity, a civilisation that has remained on the right side of history and to which China owes a lot of debt. In that spirit of broad-mindedness, he advocated that China should follow the Gujral Doctrine, i.e. China should unilaterally give concessions to India, for instance, in the boundary dispute, and that would generate tremendous goodwill for China in the hearts of Indians. China should also endorse India’s relations with the US and Japan and use India’s good offices to mend relations with them.

Thus, the visit gave our delegation insights into the diverse foreign policy perspectives in China, helped us establish contacts with important scholars in the foreign policy research community and contributed to the dialogue process between India and China.

Published as “A Report on the Indian Think Tank Delegation to China, December 2015”, BRICS Institute Online, New Delhi, 11 February 2016:

http://bricsonline.org/index.php/2015-09-04-11-20-43/latest-articles/item/28-a-report-on-the-indian-think-tank-delegation-to-china-december-2015#sthash

China’s Soft Power Strategy

Definition of soft power

The concept of ‘soft power’ was introduced by Joseph Nye in 1990, but as a form of power, it has existed since the dawn of human history. Both hard power and soft power have contributed to the rise and fall of great powers. At the outset, we must distinguish between hard power and soft power. Hard power coincides with the classical definition of power given by Robert Dahl (1957), viz., the ability to make others do what they would otherwise not do. In such a power relation, the initial preference of an unwilling victim has to be transformed by application of one of the four means – coercion, threat of force, economic sanctions or payment of money. However, if a nation has the ability to make another nation want what it wants, i.e. the latter willingly serves the former’s interest, the power relation is called soft power. Soft power can be understood in four categories – persuasion, legitimisation, socialisation and truth-claim (Digeser 1992; Barnett and Duvall 2005; Nye 2011).

Before explaining the categories, we must clarify that certain things are misunderstood as soft power, viz., weak foreign policy, cultural products and propaganda. Soft power is an instrument of strong and assertive nations. The US, UK, France, Germany, Turkey, Russia, India, China and Japan are leaders in soft power, not Peru, Greece, Egypt, Bhutan or Cambodia, although the latter also have rich civilisational heritages. Softness, unsupported by hard power, exposes a nation to foreign invasion or economic pressure. India was attractive to foreigners hundreds of years ago, but it was weak and disunited, so it was enslaved. In the 19^th century, China was a great civilisation; still, it had to bend on its knees against the British opium traders and gunboats. However, when hard power is indiscriminately and unjustly applied, then soft power gets eroded, e.g. US invasion of Iraq, Israeli settlements in the West Bank or China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea.

As far as cultural products are concerned, someone may enjoy Chinese food but hate China or watch Bollywood and hate India. Anti-globalisation activists wear Nike shoes, drink Coke and use iPhones in protests against MNCs. Thus, cultural products are ineffective unless they turn into deep-rooted cultural habits or cultural obsession to wield any power.

Finally, soft power is not propaganda. During the Cold War, the communist countries allowed the screening of Hollywood films that were critical of the Vietnam War or exposed corruption in American political institutions, so that democracy and capitalism were discredited. But instead, the public admired the US for the freedom to criticise its government. Similarly, Bollywood films, 3Idiots and PK, have attracted the Chinese as the latter enjoy no right to satirise China’s customs or institutions.

Four Categories of Soft Power

Persuasion: Foreign governments can be convinced to adopt certain policies or positions through traditional diplomacy and moral or charismatic influence. It is possible only when a lot of goodwill prevails between the involved actors. For instance, recently, the Vatican prevailed upon the United States and Cuba to exchange diplomatic missions after half a century of hostilities. In recent times, charismatic leaders like Nelson Mandela and Hugo Chavez used to enjoy a lot of influence in their respective continents. But more often, persuasion involves the backing of hard power.

Legitimisation: After World War II, under the leadership of the United States, several international norms and institutions were established that have made any action in contravention appear illegitimate or unfeasible. Human rights and nuclear non-proliferation have been two norms that, if violated, could lead to economic sanctions and even military invasion, despite the legal sovereignty of a nation. Only if a nation has sufficient hard power can it resist the dominance of norms and institutions and even forge together alternative platforms. China successfully resisted international sanctions after the Tiananmen Square Massacre (1989), India after the Pokhran II nuclear explosions (1998) and Russia after the annexation of Crimea (2014). They have also formed institutions like BRICS to resist American dominance.

Socialisation: Power can be more effective when a nation has the capacity to mould the preferences of prominent individuals, communities and public opinion within other nations to suit its own interests. Resourceful countries invest heavily in public diplomacy initiatives like funding foreign scholars and field studies abroad, e.g. Ford Foundation and Fulbright Program grants and organising sports, entertainment and business events, e.g. Olympics, Cannes Film Festival and World Expo. The non-governmental institutions also influence public opinion through advertisements and campaigns for moral causes, e.g. Greenpeace. Moreover, through the consumption of foreign products, a public becomes gradually habituated to them and they become an integral part of the society; for instance, the recent ban on Maggi produced panic among the Indian middle class, especially students.

Truth-claim: The control over the production and distribution of knowledge has been the most powerful tool of hegemony throughout history. For thousands of years, religion has claimed access to metaphysical truths that are inaccessible to the ignorant masses. Elaborate doctrines and rituals have been developed to preserve its pre-eminent status as the only path to the Absolute Truth. Then, individual thinkers during the Enlightenment challenged the dominance of religion and pioneered secular sciences, theories and ideologies and that knowledge is preserved, distributed and updated in contemporary universities and think tanks. Eventually, since the 20^th century, news and entertainment have become the most popular media of dissemination of new ideas. Newspapers, cinema, television and now the internet are the main sources of public information. A nation that controls religion, education and research and mass media has the power to determine the truth, i.e. the way we think and thus determine the course of history.

China’s Grand Narrative

The above discussion directly pertains to the strategic thinking within China. The Communist Party-state, unlike democracies where the mandate of the people is the source of legitimacy, is based on a claim to uphold the truth. Indeed, since ancient times, every dynasty or party ruling China has claimed to represent the Mandate of Heaven. The grand narrative is that China was once great, there was peace and prosperity in the realm, then the Europeans and the Japanese came with gunboats and ruthless mercantilism and pushed China into a Century of Humiliation. After tremendous sacrifice, China achieved liberation under the leadership of Chairman Mao Zedong and the Communist Party and since 1978, China has been on the path to regain its status as the greatest power on earth. Of course, many inconvenient facts are pushed under the rug in the grand narrative, for instance, the genocides committed by Mao or the persecution of minorities like Tibetans, Uyghurs and practitioners of Falun Gong.

The narrative identifies two threats to the domestic legitimacy of the Communist Party, by implication to the rise of China, firstly, democratic revolution, i.e. scenarios like the 1989 Tiananmen Square Protests or the recent Umbrella Revolution in Hong Kong and secondly, alternative truth-claims like liberalism, Falun Gong, Islam or Christianity, as these ideologies and cults also have their own exclusive grand narratives. In the international sphere, China is concerned about two IR theories – threat theory and collapse theory. The threat theory compares China to pre-World War I Germany and states that a rising China would be a danger to regional stability, as it would want to destabilise the hegemonic peace enforced by the US in the Asia-Pacific and seek its own dominance in the region. The other, collapse theory states that China’s rise is unsustainable as it lacks vibrant features of democracy and capitalism, personal freedom, rule of law and property rights that provide stability to Western countries, and so, China would eventually fall apart like the Soviet Union. To counter these threats to its domestic legitimacy and international image, the Party-state projects its achievements of liberation and economic development and its commitment to peace, harmony, trade, diplomacy, benevolence and rationalism in the world.

 

The Comprehensive Strategy

China, like other countries, conducts traditional diplomacy of bilateral and multilateral summits. Its negotiators are reputed to bargain very hard, quite often in a bureaucratic and mechanical way that involves threats or give and take, rather than gentle persuasion. However, there has been a substantial attempt in the last decade or so to introduce more human emotions and displays of camaraderie in summit meetings. Another important change has been the new confidence in working within a multilateral format that was completely lacking two decades ago. But perhaps the most dramatic innovation by the current administration has been to introduce the charm and informality of the First Lady to diplomacy. Peng Liyuan used to be a popular military singer. She is photogenic and fashionable. She is an important asset to soften up China’s image abroad and also generate a feeling of pride at home.

China has held two norms paramount in its international diplomacy – first, One China policy, i.e. there is only one China, the Communist China, and Taiwan is a province that will eventually be reunified and second, no foreign country should interfere in the domestic affairs of another country, an effective counter to the export of democracy and human rights agenda of the US. Both positions have been quite successful. In 1971, major countries like the United States, Brazil, Saudi Arabia and Australia voted against China’s membership in the United Nations. As of today, except for 22 tiny countries, mostly in Central America and the Pacific, every nation recognises the People’s Republic of China and its One China policy. Initially, China’s strategy was to join existing international organisations like the United Nations in 1971 and the World Trade Organization in 2001, as China wanted to be recognised as a mainstream nation. Now, it is pursuing a rigorous policy of establishing alternative organisations to counter American hegemony. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is a counterpart of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and BRICS of the G7. But nothing can compare to the establishment of two banks in 2015 – the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, challenging the dominance of the Bretton Woods institutions and the Asian Development Bank. These banks will be big game-changers along with ambitious projects like One Belt One Road and China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.

The paramount leader of China from 1978, Deng Xiaoping, had advised his successors to ‘keep a low profile’ or ‘hide your capabilities, bide your time’. They had followed his advice, but by 2008, they felt that China’s moment had arrived. China launched two mega-events that showcased its history, culture, wealth, technological and physical prowess – the Beijing Olympics (2008) and the Shanghai World Expo (2010). There is no doubt that China’s engagement with the world has been successful; we can see that from the rising number of tourists visiting China and also the number of Chinese travelling abroad. China’s traditional culture already has a lot of consumers worldwide, whether it is Chinatowns in Western metropolises, Chinese food, Feng Shui, Acupuncture or Shaolin Kung Fu. However, China has been weak in contemporary icons and brands. Only Huawei mobile phone and Alibaba e-retailing brands have global name recognition. However, the founder of Alibaba, Jack Ma, has really turned into something of an international phenomenon.

I had recounted earlier the importance of the production and distribution of knowledge to soft power. China has a comprehensive strategy to control the three things that control the human mind – religion, education and media. In the last decade, the Communist Party has tried to revive Confucianism to stop the excesses of wealth accumulation. Qufu, the birthplace of Confucius, is the holiest place for the Chinese, and it is receiving more and more visitors. The Hu Jintao administration was so obsessed with Confucius that in 2011, it set up a statue of Confucius at Tiananmen Square opposite the huge portrait of Mao Zedong. But after warnings by Maoist ideologues, the statue disappeared overnight.

China believes that it can benefit from the soft power of Buddhism, so it holds the World Buddhist Forum every three years. The fourth Forum took place in October 2015 at Wuxi, Jiangsu province. But China has an irritant in the form of the 14^th Dalai Lama. So, it is undermining his authority by propping up an 11^th Panchen Lama appointed by the Party-state, while the boy appointed by the Dalai Lama as the real Panchen Lama has been in Chinese custody for a couple of decades, with no knowledge of his whereabouts or well-being. China has even passed an administrative order regulating the reincarnation of lamas in their territory, and there are now thousands of China-approved lamas who have reincarnated in Tibet. China also supports the worship of Dorje Shugden, who was declared an evil spirit by the Dalai Lama, and so, the worshippers of the spirit despise the Dalai Lama. The religious minorities like the Falun Gong that are incompatible with the one official truth are outrightly banned and their followers persecuted. The conservative Muslims and Christian evangelists are also suppressed.

In education, Confucius Institutes are the biggest project to teach the Chinese language, culture and the official version of history to foreigners, in foreign university campuses. There is a massive concentration of Confucius Institutes in the United States and Western Europe. Another huge project is the partnership between the University of Washington and Tsinghua University to set up a Global Innovation Exchange in Silicon Valley. It will be the first university established in collaboration with China outside of China. Meanwhile, both the Chinese students studying abroad and foreign students in China are increasing. The US has been the preferred destination for more than 300,000 Chinese students this year. The number of scientific research papers and patent applications continues to rise in China, but there is a question mark over their originality and quality.

The Chinese film and music industry continues to grow, but there are serious issues about music piracy and a lack of foreign audience for Chinese films. However, Chinese investors have now set their eyes upon Hollywood, which is welcoming of the investment required for its no-cost-spared type of epic productions. With Chinese investments in Hollywood productions, the narratives will naturally portray China in a more complementary light. Besides films, China has also invested heavily in the international news-entertainment business. The big four companies are China Central Television, China Radio International, Xinhua News Agency and China Daily newspaper.

On the one hand, China wants to enter the international media business; on the other, it prohibits and censors news coming from foreign media outlets. It maintains an internet blockade of many popular Western social media outlets, which is termed the Great Firewall of China. It has two advantages – first, it prevents alternative and subversive narratives from entering the discourse in China and second, Chinese companies can build their own social networks and thus profit from the huge market.

Conclusion

1. China needs soft power for both domestic legitimacy and international image.

2. China has both offensive and defensive soft power strategies.

3. Although having many inherent deficiencies, China continues to innovate and find new ways to play the soft power game.

References

Barnett, Michael and Duvall, Raymond (2005), “Power in global governance” in Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (eds.) Power in Global Governance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dahl, Robert A. (1957), “The Concept of Power”, Behavioural Science, 2 (3): 201-215.

Digeser, Peter (1992), “The Fourth Face of Power”, The Journal of Politics, 54 (4): 977-1007.

Nye, Joseph S., Jr. (1990), “Soft Power”, Foreign Policy, (80): 153-171.

---- (2011), The Future of Power, New York: PublicAffairs.

Based on the lecture “China’s Soft Power Strategy” presented in the Forum for Integrated National Security (FINS) Thinkers’ Meet on Power of Soft Power held on 22 November 2015 at Gujarat National Law University, Gandhinagar, Gujarat.

Published as “China’s Soft Power Strategy”, FINS Bulletin, Mumbai, 4 January 2016:
https://finsindia.org/chinas-soft-power-strategy/